The requirements of double effect are as follows:
- the nature of the act is itself good, or at least morally neutral;
- the agent intends the good effect and not the bad either as a means to the good or as an end itself;
- the good effect outweighs the bad effect in circumstances sufficiently grave to justify causing the bad effect and the agent exercises due diligence to minimize the harm
We cans see how this meets the requirements of double effect:
1.) Taking the promotion is, itself a morally neutral act.
2.) The primary income earner means well when taking the promotion and moving his/her family across the country.
3.) The primary income earner determines that the good of the move will outweigh the negatives, even if this means a strained relationship with Billy. He or She tries to make it up to Billy by spending more time with him, but for the most part Billy is still resentful.
Under double effect, the primary income earner would have no responsibility, regarding Billy's hurt feelings, even though he/she knew in advance that this would harm their relationship.
As I see it, the problem with double effect is that it absolves a person from the moral harm of a foreseen consequence of an action. This would be no problem with a Utilitarian ethic, but as Catholics like to point out maximizing pleasure and minimizing harm is an insufficient form of moral reasoning. "One can't do evil, so that good will occur," is a common refrain in Catholic circles. Double-effect, in practice, can look very much like utilitarianism.*
Using double effect reasoning, a woman with an ectopic pregnancy can have her fallopian tube and fetus surgically removed, while remaining innocent of the sin of abortion. In this case, the intention is to remove the troublesome fallopian tube, not have an abortion. The removed fetus is an unintended and unfortunately necessary consequence of accomplishing the primary intention (removing the fallopian tube).
Once again I see the reasoning as insuffient. Although a consequence may be sad or unintended, if you fully know something bad will happen as a result of an action, committing that action anyway, is in some way still intending for the bad to occur.** Just because I don't like the consequences of my action, doesn't mean I'm not responsible for those consequences, when I have a reasonable knowledge of my action's outcomes.
Logically, double effect makes little sense.
* I, personally, have no problems with Utilitarian moral reasoning in these situations.
** I am not saying that woman aborting a fetus for medical reasons commits a moral wrong. I'm simply using this example to point out the absurdity of double-effect logic and why such silly logic is necessary when one holds an absolutist view on abortion.
Suppose there's a country of 100 million people that's being ravaged by a disease that claims 1 million lives a year. A doctor invents a vaccine that will prevent all those deaths, except that he fully anticipates that 0.01% of the population will (unpredictably) have a fatal allergy to the vaccine, even though he's done everything possible to minimize that number.
ReplyDeleteIf he doesn't release the vaccine, he fully foresees that 1 million people a year will die, for lack of the vaccine.
If he does release the vaccine, he fully foresees that 10,000 people will die from the vaccine.
According to double effect, the doctor is a hero, since the good of his releasing the vaccine far outweighs the harm.
But you say: "Although a consequence may be sad or unintended, if you fully know something bad will happen as a result of an action, committing that action anyway, is in some way still intending for the bad to occur.** Just because I don't like the consequences of my action, doesn't mean I'm not responsible for those consequences, when I have a reasonable knowledge of my action's outcomes."
So, should we point out to the doctor that he intended those 10,000 deaths? Put the doctor on trial for some crime? Allow him to be successfully sued in the civil courts -- so that no doctor ever dares to come up with such a vaccine again?
"So, should we point out to the doctor that he intended those 10,000 deaths? Put the doctor on trial for some crime? Allow him to be successfully sued in the civil courts -- so that no doctor ever dares to come up with such a vaccine again?"
ReplyDeleteIn short, of course not. Horray for the doctor for finding a quick solution to the plague.
I have no problem with the doctor's actions because I do not hold to the sort of black and white absolutist ethics espoused by the Catholic Church. It seems a Utilitarian approach would work just fine in this doctor, virus, vaccine scenario. The doctor is still a hero.
You seem to miss the point of my post, which is that double-effect attempts to separate out all the consequences from a given action, claim the ones that are good, but pretend the bad ones were unintended, even though all the consequences were fully known at the time of acting.
X action is known to cause A, B, and C
A and B are very positive results, but C is bad.
By committing X, you are still willing for C to occur, even though you you don't like the result.
In short, double-effect is a cop-out.
Kacy: "Horray for the doctor for finding a quick solution to the plague."
ReplyDeleteWe agree that he is a hero.
But you also claimed that the doctor in some way intended for those 10,000 allergy deaths to occur. Do you still claim that?
It seems to me it would be extremely unfair to say that the doctor in any way intended even one of those deaths. Each of them was unpredictable, and he did everything possible to reduce the number. If the doctor were to sue you in the civil courts for defamation (for claiming that he intended those allergy deaths), what kind of defense would you present? I imagine that the doctor would simply claim that although he certainly foresaw that those deaths would occur, none of those allergy deaths were anything that he was trying to achieve, but there was nothing he could do about it (unless he gave up on the vaccine, and let those million a year die). In what way would his claim be a "cop-out"?
Yes, I still claim that. Knowledge of the consequences of an action are directly related to the ethics of performing that action. I still hold that the doctor did the best he could in a given circumstances, and that even though some people died, countless others were saved. He is still a hero. I have no problem stating this, as I said in the post and in the previous comment.
ReplyDeleteThe burden of proof rests on the person holding an absolutist moral ethic to show why the doctor isn't committing a grave sin. Double-effect attempts to do this.
I simply cannot figure out what is meant by "intend," other than simply "I don't like the bad outcome and wish the moral universe was set up in such a way that I could perform an action without the known bad outcome." Sure, most of us wish that the universe were set up in such a way that I could perform a given action, with only the desired outcomes and not the negative ones. But it isn't, the two will sometimes go hand-in-hand.
I like chocolate donuts. I know they are yummy (good outcome). I also know that eating a lot of chocolate donuts will make me fat (negative outcome). If I eat four chocoalte donuts a day, I will recieve both the pleasure of the donuts (good outcome) and gain about 5 lbs. in two weeks (negative outcome). If I eat the chocolate donuts, I am still willing both these actions because I fully understand the consequences.
Can you please explain to me what you mean by "intention" and how one can have knowledge of an outcome, perform the action that will result in that action, and somehow still not will it to occur. The only way this makes sense to me is if ignorance is involved, but the principle of double-effect, expressly rules out ignorance.
As for the doctor suing for defemation. Well, that's just petty, especially considering I've already said that he has done the most ethical thing in the situation. This doesn't change the fact that lives were lost and that his vaccine (and him as the inventor of the vaccine) were not somehow responsible for this as agents involved in their demise. This just means that sometimes life throws you a lose-lose scenario, and when this happens you do your best. I think the best way of handling this is honesty. Sure the doctor is responsible for a small number of allergy deaths (as are the manufacturers of various vaccines we use today), but that in no way undoes or nullifies the fact that he is also responsible for saving countless millions.
Kacy: "Can you please explain to me what you mean by 'intention' ..."
ReplyDeleteThe meaning assigned to that word is crucial. It's not so helpful to look it up in a dictionary, because double-effect has to be used with a particular understanding of the word. I gave what is probably a good enough equivalence for it when I used the words "trying to achieve".
Thus, to stick with the case of the vaccine: If that doctor is offered the possibility (for a negligibly low cost or difficulty) of reducing the number of those who will die because of an unpredictable allergy, while keeping unchanged the count of those saved, and he is happy and eager to take advantage of that possibility, then we could reasonably conclude that the doctor is not trying to achieve the death of the allergy sufferers (i.e. equivalently, he is not intending to kill them).
Likewise, if the doctor were offered the possibility (for a negligibly low cost or difficulty) of coming up with an even more effective vaccine, which will increase the number of those saved each year, while keeping the total number of fatal allergies the same, we could reasonably conclude that he is trying to achieve the saving of as many as possible (i.e. equivalently, he is intending to save them).
Perhaps that makes it a bit clearer the sense that 'intend' is meant in?
Given that, double effect (boiled down a bit) imposes two rules on any proposed action:
1) Any good that results from an action must be greater than any evil that results from the action (or inaction).
2) No evil (action or effect) must ever be intended.
Note that the first rule is a kind of utilitarianism. So, overall, double effect is more strict than that utilitarianism.
Double effect requires that any actor is both responsible for any evil that is intended, and also fully responsible for making sure that good and evil are correctly balanced (i.e. comparing the good vs. evil costs of action, as well as inaction).
Even if a particular evil is not intended, that in no way frees any double-effect actor from the necessity of also balancing good and evil. In what sense, then, is double-effect a "cop out"?
Alright, now we're getting somewhere with a definition "trying to achieve."
ReplyDeleteIn your doctor scenario, he was certainly trying to achieve a cure for the plague when he invented his vaccine. But after trails, tests on baby bunnies, etc., he learns that his vaccine WILL cause allergic reactions. He now KNOWS this to be a fact, and he still supports a mandatory vaccination program.
With the KNOWLEDGE of the outcomes, he is still "trying to achieve" every possibility of his vaccine by initiating the program. My argument is that w/knowledge comes responsibility and the chutzpah to admit your responsibility in an act, knowing the outcomes, even if you find the outcomes undesirable.
My argument against double-effect is very similar to the argument used in Theology of the Body for the proper language of sex. Sex is a unative and procreative act, and the Catholic argument is that each act must be open to these possibilities. You know that having Church-approved sex can result in a baby, and you should welcome that baby, even if your real intention at the moment was simply a fun romp-in-the-hay. You can't separate out the outcome, a baby, even if the outcome was really undesired. You are still responsible for the baby you created, even if you were not "intending" to have a baby. (Note: I'm using the universal of the philosophical "you.")
Trying to achieve" works very well in this case because your actions did the talking, so to speak. You chose to commit an act, knowing the possibility of the outcomes. The same goes for your doctor, he supported the vaccine program, knowing that x number of people would die from the vaccine.
In the doctor case, I would separate the act of inventing the vaccine (when he doesn't fully know the outcome of his invention) from the act of endorsing his vaccine (after assumed tests in which he learned that x number of people would have an allergic reaction). In the act of inventing the vaccine, one can argue that he as not "intending" or "trying to achieve" vaccine related deaths. In the act of endorsing the vaccine, he has full knowledge of the consequences, and he is choosing to endorse the vaccine with these consequences in mind. In other words, he is "intending" or "trying to achieve" every outcome, both cure and injury, that results from his endorsement. It is, in-fact, the knowledge of the consequences that makes double-effect a cop-out.
First, let me point out another way of looking at the overall goal of using double effect. It's a method of answering a question like:
ReplyDeleteQ. "I'd like to perform a particular action because of the good it brings about. But the action will also bring about some evil effects. Can I still perform the action?"
And the answer is of the form:
A. "If you run through the various steps of double effect, and it shows that the action is permissible, then you will not be doing something morally wrong if you perform the action, and thus you will not be deserving of any punishment for it. But if double effect says you may not perform the action, and you go ahead and do it anyway, then you will be doing something morally wrong, and thus deserving of punishment."
Kacy: "My argument is that w/knowledge comes responsibility and the chutzpah to admit your responsibility in an act, knowing the outcomes, even if you find the outcomes undesirable."
But then exactly what does 'responsibility' mean there? It's not a word with an entirely fixed meaning. If it means something along the lines of: "Being held accountable for defending actions that were chosen", or "Admitting that a particular choice of action may lead to evil effects" then it's completely compatible with what's going on in double effect.
So I'm still not seeing exactly what the cop out is, or what might be being evaded or denied when double effect is used.
But then exactly what does 'responsibility' mean there? It's not a word with an entirely fixed meaning. If it means something along the lines of: "Being held accountable for defending actions that were chosen", or "Admitting that a particular choice of action may lead to evil effects" then it's completely compatible with what's going on in double effect.
ReplyDeleteIt does mean those things. In praxis and in the individual psyche, the two things likely look so much alike, that there is no outwardly recognizable distinction. Philosophically, however, the distinction is important...especially when we get into conversations about moral absolutism or even theodicy. (See this post for an example: http://exconvert.blogspot.com/2012/08/guest-post-double-effect-dilemma-and.html)
The cop-out is that Catholics want to claim a moral absolute such as "abortion is murder," but then use double-effect as a tricky way of getting out of a moral absolute. It's wanting to obtain a moral absolutist system, until it becomes inconvenient. Once again it's a philosophical cop-out, not a practical cop-out. I could see it being a psychological cop-out in some situations, but these situations would only be necessary if one already holds to a moral absolutist system.
Kacy: "The cop-out is that Catholics want to claim a moral absolute such as 'abortion is murder'..."
ReplyDeleteBut that is not the actual claim. The claim has to be stated more precisely: "It is always morally wrong to intend abortion". (With 'intend' being meant along the lines of what I have been describing: 'trying-to-achieve'.)
Kacy: "... but then use double-effect as a tricky way of getting out of a moral absolute."
With the correct statement of what the moral absolute is, there's no permissible way of avoiding it, tricky or otherwise. There is no cop out.
I need a little more explanation here. You've only said "That's not the actual claim," but you haven't explained how I get the claim wrong or why performing an action in which the end result is known is NOT intending that action. I've already explained why "trying to achieve" collapses on itself when a person KNOWS an action will necessarily result in another action, desirable or undesirable. You just keep repeating the double-effect claim, without engaging my argument on why it doesn't work.
ReplyDeleteKacy: "you haven't explained how I get the claim wrong ..."
ReplyDeleteYou indicated that the Catholic moral absolute is "abortion is murder". Since that leaves out any mention of the Catholic idea of intention (i.e. trying-to-achieve), it leaves out what is a very important part of the Catholic claim.
Kacy: ".. or why performing an action in which the end result is known is NOT intending that action"
I gave an example of how we decide whether someone is trying-to-achieve something in the case of the doctor's vaccine: the doctor definitely knows that the vaccine will sometimes cause fatal allergies, and is entirely willing to change the vaccine to get rid of this allergy, but he simply doesn't know how to do that. And since he doesn't know how to get rid of the allergies, failing to get rid of the allergies can't be intentional.
You haven't given your own definition for 'intention'. The closest I've found is where you say: "if you fully know something bad will happen as a result of an action, committing that action anyway, is in some way still intending for the bad to occur." But what "in some way" means is not actually explained. There's a gap in the argument there, since there's a distance between "intentional" and "in some way intentional".
If your "in some way intentional" refers to something like: "Deliberately and consciously only performing the action after determining that the good effect outweighs the bad", that's fine.
In the case of the doctor, you need to seperate the process of inventing the vaccine from the process of distributing it. Since he doesn't know how many vaccine related injuries (if any) will come from his invention, I think it is fair to say that double effect simply doesn't come into play here. Knowledge of the outcome is one of the requirements for double-effect to come into play, and this is the root of my argument against intentionality and double-effect.
ReplyDeleteThis is why I said, the doctor would only be intending the outcome, if after multiple trials and experiments, he had knowledge that his vaccine would cause x number of allergy related deaths, but supported its release anyway. Knowledge is the key difference here.
As for my definition of intention, take out the "in some way" part and it still stands. If you know an outcome of an action, good and bad, and commit the action, you are willing the known outcomes of that action. You are intending them. Committing the action is an act of the will, an act of intention, towards the known outcomes. Now if there are unknown consequences as the result of an action, that is something different. Those unknown consequences were also unintentionally, since the person committed the action with different outcomes in mind.
"If your "in some way intentional" refers to something like: "Deliberately and consciously only performing the action after determining that the good effect outweighs the bad", that's fine."
I fully agree with this statement, but this is not double-effect. This is more along the lines of calculated utilitarianism, something Catholic moral apologists are quick to reject.
Kacy: "Knowledge of the outcome is one of the requirements for double-effect to come into play"
ReplyDeleteTo be more precise, it's a belief in the outcome. For example, if the vaccine doctor believed (based, say, on his prior experience with other vaccines) that 10,000 were going to die from allergies, then he would have to act based on that belief (even if it turned out later to be wrong).
If the doctor doesn't know anything at all about the potential for fatal allergies, and has no reason to believe that there are going to be any, then of course double effect doesn't apply, because the doctor has no reason to believe that any evil effect exists.
But if the doctor believes (or even knows) about the fatal allergies, but simply doesn't have the knowledge of how to get rid of them, then his failure to get rid of them can't be intentional.
Paul C. "If your 'in some way intentional' refers to something like: 'Deliberately and consciously only performing the action after determining that the good effect outweighs the bad', that's fine."
Kacy: "I fully agree with this statement, but this is not double-effect."
I didn't say it was a complete definition of double effect. There are (developing on from what I said earlier) two rules for double effect:
(1) Any good that results from an action must be greater than any evil that results from the action (or inaction).
(2) You must never try to achieve an evil action or effect.
The permitted occurrence of an evil effect can be said to be "in some way intentional" in (1), as well as "in some way intentional" in (2). They just can't be the same kind of "in some way intentional", because they refer to different kinds of thinking and planning.
The Catholic terminology is to refer to the "in some way intentional" in (2) as just "intentional", and then "in some way intentional" in (1) is a deliberative process of thinking ahead of time about the good and evil consequences of the action (foresight).
"But if the doctor believes (or even knows) about the fatal allergies, but simply doesn't have the knowledge of how to get rid of them, then his failure to get rid of them can't be intentional."
ReplyDeleteYou keep going back to this, and I keep saying that we need to distinguish between the process of making the vaccine, and the process of releasing the vaccine KNOWING that it will kill x number of people.
Call it foreknowledge, call it belief in an outcome, call it expectations--when you commit an act understanding that C WILL result from A. You are willing C by doing A. You are intending it. You are trying to achieve it.
Knowledge, foreknowledge, strong belief that something will happen...these are the things I take issue with when it comes to double effect.
Kacy: "Call it foreknowledge, call it belief in an outcome, call it expectations--when you commit an act understanding that C WILL result from A. You are willing C by doing A. You are intending it. You are trying to achieve it."
ReplyDeleteI do think I've been grasping your point in what you say here, and I've been giving two different but related kinds of response. Let me try to identify them more precisely:
(A) In the kind of circumstance you're pointing out above, you're using 'intention' in a different sense than the one that's meant in the Catholic context of morals, or of double effect. Your usage is reasonable for some purposes, but the trouble is that there are multiple overlapping possible meanings for 'intention', and the particular usage you've chosen is not a helpful one for use in double effect.
(B) There's a rationale for why 'intention' is used in a specific way in Catholic issues relating to moral goods and evils (such as in double effect). Let me try to explain that more fully:
Suppose some particular action is performed by somebody, and we want to decide if it is morally wrong. I.e we want to know if we should tell them "You should not have done that. That was wrong." Here's an example action:
A man knowingly cuts off another person's hand.
Was that personally morally good or morally bad for the man to do? I.e. should we tell the man "You should not have done that"?
It's completely impossible to decide -- unless we know what the man was thinking and planning when he decided to cut off the hand.
For example, he may be a surgeon who knows that unless the hand is cut off, the other person will lose his whole arm because of some rapidly spreading bacteria, and the surgeon's goal is to save the arm.
Or, he may be a surgeon who knows that the hand could be saved from the bacteria by a simple antiseptic cream, but he rather enjoys the operation of cutting off someone's hand, and selects that more drastic option because of the pleasure it will give him.
Endless examples could be given as to why the hand is cut off, but the personal moral rights and wrongs can't be properly decided without some kind of access to the man's thinking.
In Catholic moral terminology, that kind of access to thinking is called determining someone's intentions, and is the only way that personal moral wrongs and rights can be decided.
Now it is certainly true that, in the English language, instead of saying "A man knowingly cuts off another person's hand", we could choose to say "A man intentionally cuts off another person's hand". But that's actually a different meaning for the word "intentional" than the one used in double effect, where 'intention' rather means something along the lines of: "What the person was thinking and planning prior to performing the action".
To use 'intentional' in the sense of 'knowingly' when 'intention' is meant rather in the sense of 'the goal chosen as explained by thinking and planning prior to an action' can cause very great confusion.
Kacy: "Call it foreknowledge, call it belief in an outcome, call it expectations--when you commit an act understanding that C WILL result from A. You are willing C by doing A. You are intending it. You are trying to achieve it."
Those can all be meaningful sentences. However, if those sentences don't contain any information about what the person was thinking or planning prior to the action, then they are useless for helping to decide on the personal moral rightness or wrongness of the actor.
(There's a caveat to all the above, that in moral issues decisions are short-circuited for the special case of intrinsic evils.)
Paul: "(A) In the kind of circumstance you're pointing out above, you're using 'intention' in a different sense than the one that's meant in the Catholic context of morals, or of double effect. Your usage is reasonable for some purposes, but the trouble is that there are multiple overlapping possible meanings for 'intention', and the particular usage you've chosen is not a helpful one for use in double effect."
ReplyDeleteThis is because the Catholic meaning of intention is ultimately substanceless.
"Those can all be meaningful sentences. However, if those sentences don't contain any information about what the person was thinking or planning prior to the action, then they are useless for helping to decide on the personal moral rightness or wrongness of the actor."
A person's thinking or planning is based on his or her perceived knowledge of the accepted outcome. In your cutting off the hand example, a person perceives this will cause healing or harm, depending on the situation. Outcome-perception goes into the thinking/planning/goal/intention process. Applying this idea does not change anything I've said regarding the relationship of intention to the known outcome of an action. One still plans the process to carry out a goal, acting on this process is in fact willing the goal. You've simply added an irrelevant layer here and failed to address my criticism of double-effect, that wiling an action with a known consequence is intending that consequence.
This just further proves the point that this intention category is ultimately meaningless and silly.
Followed the link from Pharyngula; might as well shoot my mouth off while I'm here....
ReplyDeletePaul's example of the amputation fails to support his point. Amputation is justified (or not) on medical grounds -- what is the standard treatment for an infection of such-and-such a severity? Another doctor, if provided with the facts in the form of pathology reports etc, could potentially second-guess the surgeon and show that the amputation was not justified, that it was malpractice. State-of-mind comes in only when the ethics board and/or the judge in the resulting lawsuit have to determine whether the surgeon acted from malice or mere incompetence (and the latter is not necessarily a morally innocent thing).